從《瑜伽論記》析論〈真實義品〉「離言自性」的語言哲學及對「說一切有部」語言觀的批判

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提要

　　本論文要處理的問題有兩點：（一）、從《瑜伽論記》的解說，析論《瑜伽師地論・菩薩地・真實義品》之「離言自性」（梵 nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā），試圖釐清這一概念的意義，及其語言哲學內涵。（二）、嘗試分析在《瑜伽論記》的記載中，基於〈真實義品〉「離言自性」的語言哲學，而批判「小乘人」（「說一切有部」）之語言觀存在的三個過失。

　　關於這兩個本文的論題，筆者的觀點是：(1)、所謂的「離言自性」（相當於「勝義諦」）是指就勝義而言，實「有」離開語言活動的「唯事」（梵 vastu-mātra，可說是事物之「終極指涉對象」）之存在；而和「假說自性」（相當於「世俗諦」），相搭配的概念。(2)、在《瑜伽論記》中，這「離言自性」的「唯事」，是指清淨之「依他起性」和「圓成實性」；而「遍計所執性」和雜染之「依他起性」，則是屬於「假說自性」，即語言活動的範圍。(3)、〈真實義品〉建立「離言自性」的「實有『唯事』」，是爲了澄清「空」的教義，爲了建立遠離「增益執」與「損減執」之「善取空」（或「中道」）而成立的。(4)、「增益執」是指「小乘人」（「說一切有部」）的過失，他們以爲名言「色等『法名』」（「能指」）所指涉的「色等『想法』」（「所指」），是有其自性、法體的，不能明瞭實際上除了「離言自性」的「實有『唯事』」外，名言「色等

『*法名*』」（「能指」）及其指涉的「*色等『想法*』」（「所指」）都是屬於「*一切唯假*」的「*假說自性*」層面。(5)、依據《瑜伽論記》的記載，小乘人（「說一切有部」）這樣的語言觀有三個過失：「*一、隨名多體失；二、名前無體失；三、名前生覺失*。」。(6)筆者以為，值得注意的是：依據《瑜伽論記》，〈真實義品〉建立「*一切唯假*」（言說活動的「*假說自性*」層面），和「*假必依實*」（離言說活動的「*離言自性*」層面）的語言哲學，並以此說明「空」義。建立了離開語言活動的「*離言自性*」之「*唯事*」是實「有」的，而並非瑜伽行派後來發展的「唯識」說。就此而言，這是對中觀學派「空」教義的一種澄清，也就是〈真實義品〉所謂的「*善取空*」者！

關鍵詞：假說自性、離言自性、「能指」（「*色等『法名*』」）、「所指」（「*色等『想法*』」）、「終極所指」（「*唯事*」）、增益執、善取空、語言哲學

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An Analysis of "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*"

of the *Tattvārtha Chapter* and its Criticism of

Sarvāsti-vādin's View of Language

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Abstract：

This article will address two issues： 1. From the perspective of *Yuqielun ji's* records, analyze the philosophy of language of the concept "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā* (the inexpressible essential nature)" in the *Tattvārtha Chapter of Bodhisattvabhūmi of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra.* 2. Expound the *Tattvārtha Chapter*'s criticism of Sarvāsti-vādin's view of language from the three mistakes stated in *Yuqielun ji*'s records.

My views on the above two issues are： (1) The "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*" is simply the "*vastu-mātra*(the given thing itself, ultimate referent)", which belongs to the domain of knowledge of the supreme essential nature of all dharmas [just like the "*paramārtha-satya*(ultimate truth)"]; and it complements the concept of "*prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva*(the essential nature conceptualized by verbal designation)" [just like the "*saṃvṛti-satya*(conventional truth)"]. (2) In *Yuqielun ji* the "*vastu-mātra*" of "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*" means pure "*paratantra-svabhāva*(the 'dependent on others to arise' self-nature)" and "*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*(the 'perfect accomplished real' self-nature)". The "*parikalpita-svabhāva*(the 'everywhere schematizing what is grasped' self-nature)" and foul "*paratantra-svabhāva*" belong to the domain of

"*prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva*", which is the domain of verbal designations.　(3) The establishment of the "*vastu-mātra*" of "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*" in the *Tattvārtha Chapter* is to clarify the concept "*śūnyatā*(emptiness)" and to establish the "*su-gṛhītā śūnyatā*(emptiness correctly apprehended)"[or the "Middle Path"] that distances itself from the errors "*samāropa-abhiniveśa*(affirming error)" and "*apavada-abhiniveśa*(denigrating error)".　(4) The error "*samāropa-abhiniveśa*(affirming error/the attachment of affirming too much)" refers to Sarvāsti-vādin's mistaken view of language. They don't realize that only the "*vastu-mātra*" of "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*" is authentic reality. Instead, they mistakenly view the "referent(dharmas [such as "form," etc.] conceptualized by our mind)" to have its own "*svabhāva*(self-nature)" or "substance". In fact, both the "name(names [such as "form," etc.] of the dharmas) " and the "referent" belong to the domain of verbal designations of "*prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva*".　(5) According to *Yuqielun ji*'s records, Sarvāsti-vādin's view of language has three mistakes : '① If we assign many different referring names for a thing, then the same one thing will have many different substances. ② Things do not have substances before we assign referring names. ③ We have cognition of things before we assign referring names to them.'　(6) It must be noted that, according to *Yuqielun ji*'s records, the *Tattvārtha Chapter* establishes the philosophy of language that 'all dharmas are "*prajñapti-mātram*(only a designation)"' [the domain of verbal designations of "*prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva*"] and that 'verbal designations refer to the authentic reality("*vastu-mātra*")' [the domain of the reality "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*" , and free from verbal conceptual construction]. And the "*vastu-mātra*" of "*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*" is what really exists and is used to explain the concept "*śūnyatā*(emptiness)". This concept "*vastu-mātra*(the given thing itself)" is different from the Yogācāra Buddhism's famous concept "*vijñapti-mātra*(consciousness only)", and this explanation clarifies the Mādhyamika Buddhism's concept "*śūnyatā*", the so-called "*su-gṛhītā śūnyatā*(emptiness correctly apprehended)".

Key words:
　　prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva (the essential nature conceptualized by verbal designation),
　　nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā (the inexpressible essential nature),
　　name (names [such as "form," etc.] of the dharmas),
　　referent (dharmas [such as "form," etc.] conceptualized by our mind),
　　ultimate referent (*vastu-mātra*, the given thing itself),
　　samāropa-abhiniveśa (affirming error/the attachment of affirming too much),
　　su-gṛhītā śūnyatā (emptiness correctly apprehended),
　　philosphy of language