「迦羅」(*Kāla*)或「三摩耶」(*Samaya*)？
——以「時間」議題論《大智度論》
批判實在論的哲學問題

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提　要

　　本文聚焦於《大智度論》中所記載論主與設問方對於「迦羅」（*kāla*）與「三摩耶」（*samaya*）兩個關於時間之語詞的論辯。筆者將以設問方引用《時經》之偈頌的問難作為線索，探究時間的概念在印度哲學的脈絡中反映著怎樣的哲學問題，以及為何《大智度論》要批判這樣的哲學立場。

　　據此，本文指出《大智度論》批判「迦羅」的理由，在於此語詞相較於「三摩耶」而言，容易使人衍生趨向於實在論的見解，甚至引發自性見，其並進一步主張應說「三摩耶」來避免實在論立場。從文本的論證可知，《大智度論》不僅批駁了時間為客觀實在的立場，也不承認時間作為知識對象。然而，《大智度論》仍需接受時間作為世俗知識之認知結構的條件。

　　簡言之，本文作出以下結論：

（一）雖然《大智度論》無梵、藏本留世，本文發現設問方引用《時經》的偈頌，可於《阿闥婆吠陀》、《邁瞿犁奧義書》、《摩訶婆羅多》、《數論頌》……等印度哲學典籍中，找出類似或對應的偈頌。在佛教文獻中，亦可在月稱之

《淨明句論》找到對應的偈頌。據此，本文認為此段偈頌反應出時間作為實體或萬物之生因的觀點，乃是基於婆羅門思想的傳統，表現為形上實在論的立場。而預設時間為實在的觀點，除了學者們所認為屬於正理—勝論學派的可能性之外，亦可能為「說一切有部」的主張。

（二）《大智度論》回應問難的論證大多以應成與兩難的方式回應，就論證本身來說，此與中觀學的論證是一致的。此外，設問方具備豐富的哲學背景，單就本文聚焦的這段文本而言，設問方極可能具有「說一切有部」的背景。

（三）針對時間的議題，本文認為《大智度論》以時間作為假名的主張，僅迴避了時間的客觀實在性，並無否定時間作為知識結構中的某種條件。在佛教哲學，不論是早期佛教剎那滅或中觀學時間假名論，均否定了時間表現為某種實體形上學型態。但在世俗知識的結構中，並沒有否定時間的工具性意義。

關鍵字：迦羅、三摩耶、時間、《大智度論》、說一切有部

Kāla or *Samaya*? : On the Philosophical Problems of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa's* Critique of Realism regarding the Issue of Time

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the debates on the two terms of time(*kāla, samaya*) that recorded in *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* (hereafter abbreviated as MPPU). In this paper, I will take the debater cited the verses form *Kāla-Sūtra* as clues to investigate into the issue of time in the context of Indian philosophy, and try to figure out what philosophical problems are represented in the light of the context, further, to explore why MPPU criticized *kāla* but *samaya*.

Accordingly, I point out that the main criticism against *kāla* is that this term tends toward realism, which is inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrines of dependent co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Moreover, the MPPU argues that *samaya* is a more appropriate term than *kāla*, since it avoids this tendency towards realism. From the arguments presented in the text, it becomes clear that MPPU not only negates time as an objective reality, but even more so as an epistemic object. However, the MPPU still may not avoid the acceptance of time as a condition for the cognitive structure of conventional knowledge.

Briefly, my conclusions are as follows,

1. Though lacking Sanskrit or Tibetan versions of the MPPU for comparative purposes, I have located verses from the *Kāla-Sūtra* cited in certain Indian philosophical texts. I confirm the existence

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of a number of similar verses and even corresponding verses in the *Atharva Veda, Maitāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, Mahābhārata,* and *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā*. The same verse, in Buddhist text, may be found in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*. Hence, this paper reveals a view of time based on the Brahmanical tradition in which it is considered a substance or the cause of all creations. Moreover, it reflects a metaphysical realist position. Although many scholars define a realist notion of time as a doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, I suggest that this view might also be a stance of the Sarvāstivāda.

2. Most arguments in the MPPU follow the *reductio ad absurdum* form of argument (*prasaṅga*) or dilemma rule, which is consistent with Mādhyamika reasoning. In addition, the debater's arguments in the MPPU reflects a rich combination of philosophical backgrounds, hence if we were to examine the debates over the issue of time in a simple and explicit manner, it is quite possible that the debater might have been a Sarvāstivādin.

This paper points out that the view of time as designation or concept (*prajñapti*) in the MPPU merely avoids the objective reality of time, but it never denies the view of time as a pre-condition for the structure of knowledge. It also indicates that, in Buddhist philosophy, both the theory of momentariness in early Buddhism and the theory of time as designation in the Mādhyamika system negated the view of time as a form of substantial metaphysics. Neither negated the instrumental meaning of time in conventional knowledge.